Abstract This paper reviews the proposal by D.J. Stewart of extending the cybernetics world view, where one is limited to just two ontological domains, those of``energy'' and``information'', by adding a third domain, the domain of``observer valued imparities''. A link is suggested between Stewart's proposals and the constructivist epistemologies of second-order cybernetics which impose on the observer the obligation to take responsibility for the worlds he or she constructs, including decisions about beliefs and purposes. A model of``science'' as a system of beliefs is presented. Finally, the model is given a general interpretation.
Introduction
Early formulations characterise cybernetics as the science of control and communication (Wiener, 1948) , of efficiency of action (Couffignal, 1960) and of circular causality in biological and social systems . Following von Foerster (see von Foerster et al., 1974) , it is now common practice to distinguish first-and second-order concerns. First-order cybernetics distinguishes, observes, measures and predicts the behaviour of observed systems. Second-order cybernetics adds to that a concern with how observers distinguish themselves and their worlds and how they, as actors, interact in order to bring forth and maintain``forms of life '' (Wittgenstein, 1953) . The cybernetician accepts explicit reflexive recognition and responsibility that he or she is just such an actor.
The constructivist epistemologies of second-order cybernetics impose on the observer the obligation to take responsibility for the worlds he or she constructs (von Foerster, 1982 (von Foerster, , 1993 . This includes decisions about beliefs and purposes (which ones should I hold or pursue?). The observer is also invited to address the question of what is the ontological status of such``beliefs and purposes''? How is he or she to answer this latter question consistently and coherently, given that decisions about ontology are themselves decisions about`b eliefs and purposes''? The paper reviews the proposal by D.J. Stewart (1989) that it is not possible to achieve completeness within a cybernetics world view where one is limited to just two ontological domains, those of``energy'' and``information'', and that what is needed is a third domain, the domain of``observer valued imparities''. This extended framework helps in the application of cybernetics to psychology and the social sciences which, according to many authorities, present issues not adumbrated in a purely natural science approach (Peters, 1958; Winch, 1958) and enriches``management cybernetics'' (Beer, 1972; Stewart, 2000) .
As a``bridge-building'' exercise, an attempt is made to link Stewart's ontological proposals with those of others in cybernetics concerned with epistemology and questions of ethics.
D.J. Stewart's ontological proposals
Stewart has proposed an elegant conceptual framework which distinguishes three ontological domains, together with a``principle of ternality'' such that correspondences may be sought and expected between entities in the three domains. He proposes a primary domain of energetic changes (closed to energy). Such changes give rise to states of affairs which, for an observer, may be informative, transmitting``differentia'', Bateson's (1972) ``differences that make differences''. This is the secondary domain, the domain of information (open to energy, closed to information). Here, there are truth and falsehood and the possibility of error in beliefs about states of affairs. Differentia may also be valued or not, pleasant or unpleasant. This gives rise to Stewart's tertiary domain, the domain of imparity, where wishes and choices are made (open to information but closed to imparity). Stewart cites Hume's Law (we may not derive``ought'' from``is'') as indicative of the fundamental nature of the distinction between the secondary and tertiary domains.
Linking Stewart's ontology and von Foerster's epistemology
Heinz von Foerster distinguishes a first-order cybernetics (of observed systems) from a second-order cybernetics (of observing systems). In his discussion of ethics and second-order cybernetics, von Foerster (1993) proposes what amounts to a reversal of Hume's Law: we cannot have an``is'' without some prior``ought'' or choice. If we choose to model ourselves as mechanicallỳ`p urposeful'', we should accept responsibility for our descriptions; we should reflexively enter into the domain of our own descriptions. To seek``value-free'' scientific explanations for human existence behaviour is itself a choice.
The link proposed between Stewart's ontological framework and von Foerster's (and others') epistemological concerns hinges on the concept of thè`o rganisational closure'' of observing systems. Just as it is the circularity of organisation (organisational closure) of observing systems that gives rise to reflexive, constructivist epistemologies (Maturana, 1969; von Foerster, 1982) , so is it the circularity of organisation of living systems that gives rise to the domain of imparity. As Maturana stresses, the circularity of organisation is the one thing that has to be conserved for a living system to survive. This need gives rise to the evolution of``algedonic'' (pain, pleasure) feedback systems (Beer, 1972 ) that help to preserve``essential variables'' (Ashby, 1956) . In biology, the computation of imparity is prior to (and the seed for) the computation of differentia (cognitive functions). To make a distinction is to assign values (Spencer-Brown, 1969) .`S cience'' as a system of belief von Foerster (1993) notes that when, as observers, we describe ourselves to ourselves, there are``undecidable'' foundational propositions. As Boxer and
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Kenny (1992) note, this calls for a third-order cybernetics, the study of how observers construe themselves as observers, their choices over foundational propositions and the role of``desire'' in the construction and defence of systems of belief (see also the discussions in Scott, 1996; . As earlier, to have a``value free'' science is itself a``desire'': the desire to seek knowledge as``justified true belief'' (Suppe, 1977) .
Rescher (1977) (and others) have proposed a two-cycle model that captures the essence of scientific praxis as a``self-corrective'' activity (see Figure 1) . Conceptual systems and a priori beliefs are justified by their logical coherence (the``why'' cycle). Models, methods and procedures are subject to the pragmatic correction of being tested against``reality'' (the``how'' cycle). There is an interaction between the two cycles: conceptual systems, as beliefs, limit what may be modelled or constructed as putative experience; novel experiences may lead both to the modification of models and to the modification of the conceptual systems that propose them. To use Gotthard Gunther's (1972) term, there is an``exchange relation'' between one's epistemology (beliefs about knowing and what may be known) and one's ontology (beliefs about being, what is, was and may be).
Concluding comments
Notice that the model in Figure 1 may accommodate other``systems of belief'', not just those of the``scientist''. It remains a major challenge for cybernetics to suggest ways in which patently pathological systems of belief, such as religious and nationalist bigotries, may be undermined and discredited. The answer is perhaps simply that of``education'' of the right kind (L. educare, to lead out). Cybernetics can both help in the design of effective educational systems and, as a contributor to second-order reflexive awareness, be a major part of curriculum content.
